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Superpositions of social networks, such as communication, friendship, or trade networks, are called
multiplex networks, forming the structural backbone of human societies. Novel datasets now allow
quantification and exploration of multiplex networks. Here we study gender-specific differences of a
multiplex network from a complete behavioral dataset of an online-game society of about 300,000
players. On the individual level females perform better economically and are less risk-taking than
males. Males reciprocate friendship requests from females faster than vice versa and hesitate to
reciprocate hostile actions of females. On the network level females have more communication
partners, who are less connected than partners of males. We find a strong homophily effect for
females and higher clustering coefficients of females in trade and attack networks. Cooperative
links between males are under-represented, reflecting competition for resources among males. These
results confirm quantitatively that females and males manage their social networks in substantially
different ways.
Essential to understanding the behavior of humans
within their socio-economical environment is the obser-
vation that they simultaneously play different roles in
various interconnected social networks, such as friend-
ship networks, communication networks, family, or busi-
ness networks. The superposition of several networks
on the same set of nodes (individuals) is called a mul-
tiplex network (MPN), Fig. 1. In social networks, in-
teractions between individuals (such as communication,
trading, aggression, revenge) can be represented as links.
Since these interactions can be unilateral and do not nec-
essarily have to be reciprocated, in general the MPN con-
sists of a set of directed, weighted and time-varying sub-
networks. The MPN is a highly non-trivial, dynamical
object which allows to quantify societies on a systemic
level. In particular the MPN captures the co-evolving
nature of societies, where on one hand actions of indi-
viduals shape and define the topological structure of the
MPN, and on the other hand, where the topology of the
MPN constrains and shapes the possible actions. The
position of an individual within the MPN has an impact
on her/his possibilities for actions in the near future and
her/his state of being. The state of an individual char-
acterizes its present situation such as its wealth, achieve-
ments, skills, number of friends, etc. The notion of the
MPN conveniently allows to study the interdependencies
of different social relations and in particular how they
mutually influence each other through network-network
interactions [1].
The study of small-scale MPNs has an established tra-
dition in the social sciences [2–5], for large societies how-
ever, in general the MPN can not be observed directly
due to immense data requirements. Nevertheless there
are recent considerable achievements in understanding
several massive social networks on a quantitative basis,
such as the cell phone communication network [6–8], fea-
tures of the world-trade network [9–11], email networks
(a)
(b)
FIG. 1. Multiplex networks consist of a set of nodes
connected by different types of links. (a) In the MMOG
dataset, six types of social links co-exist between players, rep-
resenting their friendship or enmity status, exchange of mes-
sages, trading activity, aggressive acts (attacks), and their
placing of head-money (bounties) on others as a means of
punishment. (b) Each player of the MMOG Pardus chooses
a male (circles) or female (squares) gender when joining the
game.
[12], the network of financial debt [13] and the network
of financial flows [14]. The integration of various time-
varying networks on an entire society has so-far been be-
yond the scope of any realistic study.
Online media have revolutionized the possibilities of
measuring human behavior on societal levels and allow
for the possibility of transforming the social sciences
into a quantitative, experimental science [15–17]. In-
2teractive online games provide a particularly powerful
tool to quantitatively study human socio-economic mul-
tiplex data [18, 19]. These games are usually played by
thousands, sometimes even millions and offer ‘alternative
lives’ where players engage in different types of social in-
teractions, such as establishing friendships and economic
relations, forming of groups, alliances, parties, or per-
forming aggressive acts like fighting or waging war [20].
Practically all actions of all players can be recorded at a
time resolution of a second. Massive Multiplayer Online
Games (MMOGs) open a previously unimaginable po-
tential for data-driven, quantitative socio-economic un-
derstanding of human societies [1, 20–22], with three ob-
vious advantages over traditional methods: (i) Complete
information on the topology of the MPNs: All topolog-
ical properties of the MPN are available. The inter-
dependence of the different networks in the MPN reveals
the organization of the system at different levels [1]. (ii)
Complete information about the co-evolution of the MPN
with the behavior, actions and performance of individual
players. Players can be grouped into different classes such
as their gender so that the MPN can be studied gender-
specifically. (iii) Reduced measurement bias: players are
not constantly aware of their actions being recorded –
the experimental setup does not influence the behavior
which is often a problem in behavioral experiments [23].
Humans actively influence and re-structure their local
MPN. In fact a large fraction of human activity is devoted
to re-arranging, managing and maintaining various social
networks at the same time. In this paper we focus on
gender-specific differences in managing and maintaining
local MPN environments and how this correlates with
performance. To identify differences in networking be-
havior of male and female players, we analyze complete
and coherent MPN data from a MMOG society of about
300,000 players [19].
There exist a few quantitative, data-driven studies on
gender-specific behavior with the focus on the use of com-
munication media, including a study on telephone usage
in 317 French homes [24], a large-scale Belgian mobile
phone call and test message dataset [25], and a gender-
specific content analysis of instant messages [26, 27].
Gender differences in online gaming is relatively unex-
plored, with the exception of recent work on gender roles
[28], the relation of gender and age group [29], and gen-
der swapping [30–33], i.e. the phenomenon of playing a
gender different from the biological sex.
Pardus (http://www.pardus.at) is a browser-based
MMOG in a science-fiction setting, played since Septem-
ber 2004. MMOGs are characterized by a substantial
number of users playing together online in the same
virtual environment [19, 34]. In Pardus every player
owns a single, individual account which is associated
with a game character. A character owns a spacecraft
with a certain cargo capacity, and can roam the vir-
tual universe, trade commodities, socialize, and do much
more, usually with the motivation to gain wealth, so-
cial standing, respect, and fame in the virtual world
(http://www.pardus.at/index.php?section=about). One
feature of Pardus is a trading platform which provides the
possibility for the production and distribution of virtual
goods and services. The ‘society’ of Pardus is mainly
driven by social factors such as friendship, cooperation
or competition. Its gameplay is based on socializing and
role-playing, with interaction between players, and with
interactions between players and non-player characters
[19]. It is important to mention that the various social
networks which can be extracted from the Pardus game
indeed form a MPN, in the sense that these networks are
tightly related and mutually influence each other. This
was systematically explored and quantified in [1]. For
more details on Pardus, see [20].
When signing up for the game the player choses to
be a male or female character. The gender of a char-
acter can not be changed afterwards. The consequence
of the virtual gender is that a male or female avatar is
displayed during communication in the game, see Fig. 1
(b). We have no information about the biological sex of
players. The possibility of freely choosing a virtual sex
may lead some players to experiment with gender roles
[31–34]. Selecting a gender different from the biologi-
cal is called gender swapping which is common in online
environments [35]. A survey on 8,694 players in the Ev-
erquest MMOG found that 15.5% are gender-swapped,
17% of the males and 10% of the females [30]. Similar
values are reported for the virtual environment Second
life (10% swapping of all, 16% of males, just 2.7% of fe-
males) [36] or the World of Warcraft MMOG (23% of
males, 3% of females swapping for the ‘most enjoyable’
character) [37]. In the Pardus game the data acquisition
process aggregates both possible gender-specific behav-
ioral effects resulting from the underlying biological sex
of the players on one hand, and from their chosen online
gender – regardless of sex – on the other hand.
Players can anonymously mark others as friends or en-
emies. Private Messages (PM) are the prevalent form of
communication in the game. It is comparable to email in
the real world. A PM is seen by sender and receiver only.
For more details see [20]. Communication events, friend
and enemy markings, trades, attack and bounty place-
ments are recorded as networks: A link of type ‘commu-
nication’, ‘friend’ etc. is placed from player i to j if i has
communicated with j, or has marked j as friend/enemy,
etc. Friend/enemy markings exist until they are removed
by players, while PM, trade, attack, and bounty networks
are recorded by aggregating all actions that happened
before to a given day. Friend and enemy networks are
unweighted, for all others the weights correspond to the
cumulative number of PMs sent, trades made, etc. The
actions of communication, trading, and friend marking
we consider to be positive (friendly) actions, whereas
attack, enemy marking and bounty collection are neg-
3TABLE I. Quantifiable achievements of players in the
game. These include spent APs, earned credits, experience
points earned, players killed, deaths, bounties collected. For
each player we calculate a respective daily value for these
quantities, and average over them. The respective units are
used as in the game (arbitrary units). The last column de-
notes whether the null hypothesis H0 of equal means is re-
jected. Females collect significantly more money (4-sigma
event) and experience less deaths (2 sigmas) than males.
Female Male H0 rejected
Activity (APs) 2714 2607 no
Wealth (Credits) 14619 11073 yes ****
Experience 270 250 no
Kills 0.0055 0.0063 no
Deaths 0.026 0.030 yes *
Bounties 0.0024 0.0025 no
* p-value < 0.05, **** p-value < 0.0001
ative (unfriendly). For more information on the MPN
data, see SI. The legal department of the Medical Uni-
versity of Vienna has attested the innocuousness of the
used anonymized data.
RESULTS
Females are less risk-taking but wealthier. By
economic actions such as trade, players earn virtual
money in the currency of credits. Destructive, and ag-
gressive actions such as attacking others, may result in
the destruction of those players (kills), the destruction of
oneself (death), or the collection of a bounty if a bounty
was placed on a destroyed player’s head. Players spend
action points (AP) to perform all of these actions, which
provides a measure for their overall activity. Players have
the possibility to earn experience points through various
actions or jobs, such as destroying ‘space monsters’.
In Table I we report the number of APs spent, cred-
its and experience points earned, players killed, deaths,
and bounties collected per day, averaged over all players.
To compare values from males with values from females,
we adopt a standard two-sample t-test, testing for the
null hypothesis H0 that the two distributions have equal
means, against the alternative hypothesis H1 that the
means are not equal. The test is two-tailed, making no
assumptions whether values from females are supposed
to be larger than from males or vice versa, see Meth-
ods. It is immediately clear that females accumulate sig-
nificantly more wealth (H0 rejected at 4 sigma level),
i.e. credits, than males. At the same time male players
experience significantly more deaths (rejection at 2 sig-
mas), due to more risk-taking and/or aggressive behav-
ior. This points at a much larger engagement of females
in economic, rather than destructive activities. Concern-
ing overall activity, experience points, kills and collected
bounties, female and male players perform comparably
(H0 cannot be rejected).
Females attract positive behavior. We now focus
on action weights, i.e. how many actions of each type
are initiated (out-weight) or received (in-weight) by the
average female or male player. Table II, upper panel,
shows the out- and in-weights for the different action
types. Highly significant differences for all positive ac-
tion types are observed, where females are much more
active in performing actions: marking friends (null hy-
pothesis H0 of equal means rejected at 2 sigmas), writing
private messages (3 sigmas), or initiating a trade (4 sig-
mas). At even higher significance levels (rejection of H0
at 5 sigmas) females receive positive actions with respect
to males: being marked as friend, receiving a private mes-
sage, and being on the receiving end of a trade than their
male co-players. For all negative action types males are
both more active in initiating and receiving than females,
however to a less substantial degree.
Females show homophily, males are het-
erophiles. Homophily is the tendency of individuals to
associate and link with similar others [3]. In our case we
test for linkings between individuals of the same gender.
A straightforward way to measure homophily in the mu-
tiplex data is to compare the numbers of directed links
between all gender-combinations in all networks (MM,
MF, FM, FF) to the corresponding numbers surrogate
networks where the gender of nodes is randomized. Ta-
ble II, lower panel, shows the result of this comparison.
Positive and negative Z-scores (see SI) denote the num-
ber of standard deviations by which a link type is over- or
under-represented, with respect to the randomized case.
To measure statistical significance of differences between
different combinations of genders, we compare each real
network to 1,000 surrogate networks where the gender of
the nodes was randomly reshuffled, leaving the topology
of the network intact. Clearly, female-to-female trading
and communication are the most significantly overrep-
resented link types, with a Z-score of approximately 4
sigmas. Male-to-female trades (Z=2.7) and communica-
tion (Z=2.7) are also strongly over-represented, whereas
the opposite, female-to-male trades and PMs is much less
substantial (Z=1.4 and 1.6, respectively). Male-to-male
trades and communication are highly under-represented
(Z= -2.3 for both cases). Negative link types show no
significant tendency in either direction.
Males respond fast (slow) to female friendship
(enmity) initiatives. We measure the time (days) it
takes for individuals to reciprocate an action of a given
type. For all pairs (i, j) where an action was reciprocated,
the time-to-reciprocate (ttr) is the number of days from
initial marking to reciprocation. In Fig. 2 (a) and (b) we
show the cumulative distribution functions for the time-
to-reciprocate for friendship and enmity links, for the
four possible gender permutations: MM, FF, MF, FM.
Here the first letter denotes the gender of the individual
4TABLE II. Gender-specific number of relational actions and links. Upper panel: Out-weights (actions initiated or
messages sent) and in-weights (actions/markings/messages received). For each player we calculate a daily value for the number
of actions performed and received and average them. Male values are presented as in Table I. For values with stars the null
hypothesis H0 of equal means is rejected. Females mark significantly more friends (H0 rejected at 2 sigmas) and are marked
themselves much more as friend (5 sigmas). They send and receive significantly more PMs (3 and 5 sigmas, respectively),
and perform and receive significantly more trades (4 and 5 sigmas). Females perform less attacks than males (2 standard
deviations). Lower panel: Homophily and heterophily: Over- and under-represenation, as measured by Z-scores (See SI), of
directed link types of the six networks at day 856. Each real network is compared to 1,000 surrogate networks where the gender of
nodes is randomly reshuffled. The most significant over-represented link types are female-to-female trades and communication
(PMs), followed by male-to-female trades and PMs. Female-to-male trades and PMs are over-represented, however not as
drastically. Highly under-represented are male-to-male PMs and trades. Negative links show neither substantive over- or
under-representation.
Positive links Negative links
Friends PMs Trades Enemies Attacks Bounties
Action weights
Initiated M 0.026 0.60 0.100 0.029 0.20 0.009
Initiated F 0.028* 0.74** 0.124*** 0.027 0.16* 0.009
Received M 0.022 0.45 0.066 0.036 0.116 0.0084
Received F 0.027**** 0.61**** 0.086**** 0.032 0.109 0.0074
Homophily
FF 0.6 3.9 4.2 0.6 -0.4 -0.6
MM 0.4 -2.3 -2.4 -0.6 1.0 -0.2
FM -0.4 1.6 1.4 -0.3 -1.7 0.4
MF -0.7 2.7 2.7 0.7 0.7 -0.2
* p-value < 0.05, ** p-value < 0.01, *** p-value < 0.001, **** p-value < 0.0001
who placed the initiating link, the second letter denotes
the gender of the one who reciprocated. Reciprocation
time probabilities follow a sub-exponential decrease for
about the first 30 days after a link was initiated, beyond
which distributions become approximately exponential,
P (ttr ≥ t) ∼ e−λt. The decay rate λ for friendship recip-
rocation with male initiation followed by female recipro-
cation is λMF ≈ −0.0060. For female initiation and male
reciprocation it is λFM ≈ −0.0078. The MM rate lies be-
tween, close to the FM case, λMM ≈ −0.0075, (b). Cor-
respondingly, the half-life for MF reciprocation is about
116, for FM it is only 89 days. The situation changes for
the enemy links. Here a big difference is found for the
short times: within the first 150 days of an enemy mark-
ing males reciprocate much less than females. The ap-
proximate exponential tails have a λFM ≈ −0.0065 and
λMF ≈ −0.0055, respectively. The ttr-distributions for
the other actions are found in the SI.
Gender Differences in Networking. Figure 3
shows gender differences in four network properties as
observed on day 856, illustrating the clear evidence that
males and females structure their local MPNs in different
ways. We compute the average degree k¯, the clustering
coefficient C, and the average neighbour degree knn (see
SI) independently for the 8 male control groups and the
female group, see Methods. We then subtract the value
for the female group from the average of the 8 control
groups. This difference is indicated in Fig. 3 by the let-
ter ∆. Errorbars indicate the standard deviations of the
means of the control groups. A statistical t-test supports
these results by significant rejection of the equal-means
hypothesis, see Methods and SI.
Females have more communication partners. As seen
in Fig. 3 (a) females have about 15% more communica-
tion and trading partners (degree) than males.
Females organize in clusters. Female trading networks
show a clustering coefficient (see SI) that is about 25%
higher than the one of males, Fig. 3 (b). This means
that females tend to trade with people who trade among
themselves. Also the clustering of female friendship net-
works is significantly higher than those of males, showing
a preference for stability [38] in local networks. Surpris-
ingly, also in the case of attacks females are more likely
to attack people who are in conflict with each other than
males.
Males prefer well connected communication partners.
From Fig. 3 (c) we learn that the communication part-
ners of males have more communication partners than
the communication partners of females (for the neigh-
bour degree knn, see SI). The same tendency is seen for
the male enmity networks, meaning that the typical en-
emy of a male player has more enemies than the typical
enemy of a female. In relative terms, both effects are in
the 10% range.
Females reciprocate friendships. Females invest more
effort in reciprocating links. Fig. 3 (d) reports that fe-
males reciprocate 20% more friendship and trading links
than their male counterparts. For communication and
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FIG. 2. Distributions of time-to-respond for different
genders. (a) Cumulative probability distributions for the
time-to-respond (ttr) for females to reciprocate a friendship
link, given the initiator was male (MF), and vice versa (FM).
Probabilities fall sub-exponentially in the first 30 days, later
exponentially, P (ttr ≥ t) ∼ e−λt with long-time decay rates λ
depending on gender pairs: Males are much faster to recipro-
cate female friendship initiatives (λFM = −0.0078) than the
other way round (λMF = −0.0060). (b) Situation for equal sex
reciprocation MM, and FF. Here reciprocation decay times
are in between the MF and FM case. (c) Cumulative ttr dis-
tributions for enemy links. For enemy markings, males are
considerably slower to reciprocate within the first 180 days if
the initiator was a female than vice versa. (d) Situation for
equal sex reciprocation of enemy links. Fit ranges are 100 to
365 days, fits of FF curves were not feasible.
negative links there are no substantial gender differences
observable. For the measure ∆R we considered male-
male and female-female links. More details are found in
the SI.
DISCUSSION
We quantitatively studied gender-specific behavior and
network organization in a society of humans engaged in a
virtual world of an online game. We find clear differences
of how females and males structure and manage their lo-
cal MPNs. Females show a significantly higher average
degree k¯ in their communication networks, however, the
communication partners of females have a significantly
lower average degree than those of males, i.e. females
have more communication partners, while males tend to
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FIG. 3. Differences of network properties between
male and female players (M −F ) on the last day 856.
(a) average degree k¯, (b) clustering coefficient C, (c) average
neighbour degree k¯nn. Females have higher average degrees
in PM and trade networks, as well as a higher clustering co-
efficient in trades, but considerably lower k¯nn for PMs. (d)
reciprocity R between male-male and female-female links on
the last day 856. Females are substantially more reciprocal in
friendships and trades. Errorbars denote the standard devia-
tions of the network measures obtained from the 8 male con-
trol groups (each of the size of the female group), illustrating
the substantial differences. A statistical t-test supports these
results by significant rejection of the equal means hypothesis.
For definitions see Methods.
have better connected ones. The positive MPNs of fe-
males are far more clustered than those of males. The
combination of higher clustering coefficients with lower
average neighbour degrees knn indicates that females
manage their local MPNs to be tighter and more com-
6pact. On the behavioral level females are more engaged in
the reciprocation of their positive relations, again signal-
ing that they invest more in stable and secure networks.
This is also reflected in their less risk-taking behavior and
a better overall economic performance in the game.
So far only a limited body of data-driven works on
gender-specific network organization exists. A particular
exciting one is a study on the use of classic communi-
cation media (telephone) [24], where it was found that
women call more frequently and spend about twice as
much time on the telephone than men. We find a com-
parable effect. Female players send about 25% more mes-
sages (0.74 per day) than males (0.60 per day). In [24] a
gender homophily effect [3] was found for both sexes. We
find a comparable effect for females only where female-to-
female links in the communication network are strongly
over-represented with respect to pure chance. In con-
trast to [24] we find that links between pairs of males
are less likely than expected by chance. This tendency
might be caused by the male-dominated game environ-
ment in which females may be treated far better than
males, which is a known phenomenon [30], and therefore
also receive more messages. Inter-gender response time
distributions reveal that females respond much slower
to male friendship initiatives, than males do to female
ones. We find clear evidence that females ‘attract’ pos-
itive behavior to a much higher degree than males. It
is important to note that players have neither direct in-
formation about – nor influence on – the links of their
neighbours (except for their own). Therefore, the ob-
served differences in network patterns such as clustering
coefficients and average neighbour degree, can not be ex-
plained through social group dynamics, such as e.g. in
the friendship dynamics in Facebook, but instead consti-
tute strong direct evidence for biological gender-specific
differences in networking behavior.
The direct implications of the presented work to real
societies has to be discussed with some care. First, it is
not a priory obvious how representative MMOG societies
are for real human societies, and second, how much does
gender swapping influence the results? The only way to
determine to what extent MMOGs are good models for
‘real’ society is the direct comparison of the MPNs in
games with those observable in the ‘real’ world. Previ-
ous results on the same Pardus dataset show amazingly
good agreements [20] between statistical properties of the
communication network of players and mobile phone net-
works [6, 8]. Also in [20] the evolution of network mea-
sures and of network growth patterns, including network
densification, was shown to strongly overlap with data
from ‘real-world’ societies [39, 40]. In further work [1] ad-
ditional equivalent results have been found in the study
of sociological hypotheses on structural balance [41]. We
have not explicitly conducted a survey on the extent of
gender swapping in Pardus, however we have reason to
believe that we are in the same ballpark as comparable
MMOGs [35], meaning that we expect about 15 % of
players whose avatar has a different gender than their
biological player. For all of our conclusions this fraction
can be regarded as marginal.
In conclusion, the substantial gender effects in differ-
ent types of networking and reciprocation behavior that
we find in the online world of Pardus, suggest two main
implications. First, if we assume our findings to hold
in online environments in general and if the majority
of players choose their online gender in accordance with
their biological sex, this implies that we can find and
explore traces of biological human behavior in online
environments. As previous studies on mobility [42] or
social organization hypotheses [1, 20] have shown, the
type of medium and actual physical contact are of lim-
ited relevance for a wide range of social behavior. Our
results imply an impact on the understanding of relation-
formation between individuals of different and the same
genders, and thus eventually might help to understand
reproductive strategies behind the behavior of finding
and competing for mating partners [43]. Second, our
setup demonstrates that online media increasingly blur
gender roles and can render the biological sex of social
actors less important. Without tangible signals, repre-
senting the behavior of a male or female may be more
important here than actually having male or female sex.
Lacking information on sex does not enable us to disen-
tangle sex–gender effects: Does a male acting as a female
behave differently from a female who chooses a female on-
line persona? We do not know – further data and studies
on gender-specific offline–online behavior are needed to
answer these specific details. Nevertheless, our results
could have immediate applications both offline and on-
line, in particular in control of gender-specific informa-
tion spreading, in marketing, or for smooth implementa-
tion of online social networks and dating sites [44].
METHODS
The Social Multiplex Network Data
For the MPN we considered all players of the Artemis
universe who played within the time interval from day
1 to day 856 and who performed at least one communi-
cation event, a trade, an attack, or a bounty request, or
who were involved in at least one friendship or enmity
relation on day 856 (the trade relation studied here is
all ship-to-ship trades, reflecting the business relations
in which trust is important – this is slightly different to
trade networks constructed from ship-to-building trades
which can be of more impersonal nature [1, 20]). We
discard all players who existed for less than 1 day. The
communication-, trade-, attack-, and bounty networks
were accumulated over time, enmity and friend networks
were taken as snapshots of day 856. This leads to 23,872
7players (nodes) in the MPN with 21,264 males and 2,608
females. For the time-to-respond calculations we used
also all players involved in reciprocated friendship and
enmity markings over the 856 days, increasing the total
number of players to 34,210 (30,607 males and 3,603 fe-
males). For the calculations of player achievements, we
used those 6,548 players who played on day 856.
Control Groups
At any time, there are roughly 8 to 9 times more male
than female players. For highlighting substantial gender
differences, we randomly divided the set of male players
into 8 non-overlapping control groups, each of the size of
the female group (3,603). We compute mean and stan-
dard deviation of these 8 control samples for comparing
network- and performance measures in Fig. 3 and in Sup-
plementary Table I. Following the central limit theorem,
with a large enough sample size the standard deviation
of the sample means follows a normal distribution re-
gardless of the shape of the parent population. Since the
number of samples here is very low (8), the deviations
of the sample means are to be treated with care. For
rigorous statistical testing however, we use a two-sample
t-test, see below.
Statistical Technique for Hypothesis Testing
For directly comparing values between males and fe-
males, we use a standard two-sample t-test for testing
the null hypothesis H0 that two distributions have equal
means, against the alternative hypothesis H1 that the
means are not equal. We assume equal variances and use
two tails, i.e. no preference of testing for one specific gen-
der to have larger values than the other. Thus the t-test
computes a pooled standard deviation
s =
√
(nm − 1)varm + (nf − 1)varf
nm + nf − 2
(1)
where nm, nf are the sizes of male and female values
considered, and varm, varf their variances, respectively.
The test statistic is then given by
t =
m¯− f¯√
varm/nm + varf/nf
(2)
where m¯ and f¯ denote the means of the male and female
values.
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